some questions about economics

X Time left 1:59:44 conomic Theory Choose the correct statements from the following. a. A risk averse preference is represented by a concave utility function over wealth level. O b. If a decision maker's utility over its wealth is concave, E(u( W)) > u(E(W)) where W is a random wealth level. c. Certainty equivalent of a lottery W for a risk averse decision maker is smaller than E[W]. O d. None of other options are correct. De. A decision maker never participate in a lottery whose expected value is negative.Time left 1:59:34 O d. None of other options are correct. e. A decision maker never participate in a lottery whose expected value is negative. Choose the correct statements from the following. a. No one has incentive to unilaterally deviate from NE. of O b. A dominated strategy cannot construct a NE. lestion c. In a completely mixed strategy NE, the equilibrium strategy for a player is the unique maximizer for this player given other's equilibrium strategy. Od. None of the other options are correct. e. In Prisoner's Dilemma (not repeated), there can be miss-coordination about which of multiple equilibria players should play. Choose the correct statements from the following. a. In the Principal-Agent model with risk neutral or risk averse agents, the second best total surplus is always (strictly) smaller than the first best total of surplus. Jestion b. A used car market is a typical example of hidden type. O c. If a piece of information is not contractible, then it is not observable by one party. d. In a model of hidden action, players have different information from the outset of the game. De. None of other options are correct