Spencer v Texas 1967

Who should decide the punishment of a convicted individual? Explain your answer and connect it to government in some way

learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com C + Dashboard ili Content Bb https://learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com/5fcfbb. Petitioners, who were convicted of felonies in Texas courts, challenge the then-existing procedure under Texas' recidivist or habitual- criminal statutes, whereby, through allegations in the indictment and the introduction of proof concerning a defendant's past con- victions, the jury trying the pending criminal charge was fully informed of such past convictions for sentencing purposes, but was also charged by the court that such matters were not to be taken into account in assessing the defendant's guilt or innocence under the current indictment. Petitioners claim that this procedure vio- lates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Held: Texas' use of prior convictions in the petitioners' current criminal trials did not offend the provisions of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 559-569. (a) The recidivist statutes are not unconstitutional. Pp. 559-560. (b) The States have wide leeway in dividing responsibility be- tween judge and jury in criminal cases, and it is not unconstitu- tional for the jury to assess the punishment in a criminal case, or to make findings as to a prior conviction even though enhanced punishment is left to be imposed by the judge. P. 560. (c) As in other instances where evidence of prior convictions has traditionally been admitted to serve a specific purpose, the possi- State's learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com C + Dashboard Lil Content Bb https://learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com/5fcfbb... (a) The recidivist statutes are not unconstitutional. Pp. 559-560. (b) The States have wide leeway in dividing responsibility be- tween judge and jury in criminal cases, and it is not unconstitu- tional for the jury to assess the punishment in a criminal case, or to make findings as to a prior conviction even though enhanced punishment is left to be imposed by the judge. P. 560. (c) As in other instances where evidence of prior convictions has traditionally been admitted to serve a specific purpose, the possi- bility of prejudice here is outweighed by the validity of the State's purpose in permitting introduction of the evidence. Pp. 560-561. (d) The defendants' interests were protected by limiting in- structions, and by the discretion of the trial judge to limit or forbid admission of particularly prejudicial evidence. P. 561. (e) Enforcement of recidivist statutes in a one-stage trial serves a valid state purpose. P. 563. (f) Neither the specific provisions of the Constitution nor cases decided under the Due Process Clause establish this Court as a *Together with No. 69, Bell v. Texas, on certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, argued October 17, 1966, and No. 70, Reed v. Beto, Corrections Director, on certiorari to the United States learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com + Dashboard i Content Bb https://learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com/5fcfbb... SPENCER v. TEXAS. 555 554 Opinion of the Court. rule-making organ for the promulgateon of state rules of criminal procedure. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, distinguished. Pp. 564-565. (g) The States have power to promulgate their own rules of evidence to try their state-created crimes in their own courts, as long as their rules are not prohibited by the Federal Constitution, which these rules are not. Pp. 568-569. No. 68, appeal dismissed and certiorari granted; 389 S. W. 2d 304, affirmed; No. 69, 387 S. W. 2d 411, No. 70, 343 F. 2d 723, affirmed. Michael D. Matheny, by appointment of the Court, post, p. 896, argued the cause for appellant in No. 68. With him on the brief was Joe B. Goodwin. Tom R. Scott argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 69. Emmett Colvin, Jr., argued the cause for peti- tioner in No. 70. With him on the brief were Charles W.learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content. blackboardcan.com C + Dashboard all Content Bb https://learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com/5fcfbb. tioner in No. 70. With him on the brief were Charles W. Tessmer and Clyde W. Woody. Leon Douglas argued the cause for appellee in No. 68. With him on the brief were Waggoner Carr, Attorney General of Texas, and Hawthorne Phillips, First Assistant Attorney General. Mr. Phillips argued the cause for re- spondent in No. 69. With him on the briefs were Mr. Carr, T. B. Wright, Executive Assistant Attorney Gen- eral, and Lonny F. Zwiener, Gilbert J. Pena and Howard M. Fender, Assistant Attorneys General. Mr. Fender argued the cause for respondent in No. 70. With him on the brief were Messrs. Carr, Phillips, Wright, Pena and Zwiener. T. W. Bruton, Attorney General, pro se, and Ralph Moody, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the SPENCER . TEXAS. Attorney General of North Carolina, as amicus curiae, out. P. 806, argued the cause for appellant in Na. 68. Na. co . Emmett Calvin . Jr . argued the cause for pres. in No. 69.+ learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com Dashboard Content Bb https://learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcan.com/5fcfbb.. Lwiener. T. W. Bruton, Attorney General, pro se, and Ralph Moody, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the Attorney General of North Carolina, as amicus curiae, in No. 69. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. Texas, reflecting widely established policies in the criminal law of this country, has long had on its books Teammer and Clyde W. Woody. T.W. Bruton, Attorney General go me, and Relat Attorney General of North Carsting, so amicus coriad. learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com C + Dashboard Content Bb https://learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com/5fcfbb... so-called recidivist or habitual-criminal statutes. Their effect is to enhance the punishment of those found guilty of crime who are also shown to have been convicted of other crimes in the past. The three cases at hand challenge the procedures employed by Texas in the enforcement of such statutes.' Until recently, and at the time of the convictions be- fore us, the essence of those procedures was that, through allegations in the indictment and the introduc- tion of proof respecting a defendant's past convictions, the jury trying the pending criminal charge was fully informed of such previous derelictions, but was also charged by the court that such matters were not to be taken into account in assessing the defendant's guilt or innocence under the current indictment. cally Fourier Hasces delivered the opinion of the enminet bit of this country , has leg had on its books 1 The recidivist statutes here involved are Articles 62, 63, and 64 of the Texas Pen. Code (1952). Article 62 provides: "If it be shown on the trial of a felony less@ learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com O] (I e LI [Bb] https://learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com/5fcfbb... 1 The recidivist statutes here involved are Articles 62, 63, and 64 of the Texas Pen. Code (1952). Article 62 provides: \"If it he shown on the trial of a felony less than capital that the defendant has been before convicted of the same offense, or one of the same nature, the punishment on such second or other subsequent conviction shall be the highest which is affixed to the commission of such offenses in ordinary cases.\" Article 63 provides: \"Whoever shall have been three times con- victed of a felony less than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for life in the penitentiary.\" Article 64 provides: \"A person convicted a second time of any offense to which the penalty of death is affixed as an alternate pun- ishment shall not receive on such second conviction a less punishment than imprisonment for life in the penitentiary.\" 2 These procedures were embodied in Texas Code Crim. Proc. Art. 642 (1941), providing as follows: \"A jury being impaneled in any criminal action, the cause shall proceed in the following order: 1. The indictment or information shall be read to the jury by the attorney prosecuting. . . . 4. The testimony on the part of the State shall be offered.\" By judicial gloss it appears that, at least in noncapital cases, a defendant by stipulating his prior convictions could keep knowledge of them away from the jury. See Pitcock v. State