Stargell and Schmidt are brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daly marginal cost (MC) of producing a con of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each. firm. Suppose that Stargeli and Schmidt form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.) Ploce the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Stargelf and Schmidt choose to work together. When they act as a profit-maxirniaing cartel, each company will produce cans and charge information, each firm earns a daily proft of , so the dally total industry pront in the beer market is Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total proft in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initally agreo to produce half the quantity that maximares total industry profit. Now, suppose that Stargell decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50 ab, while Schmidt continues to produce the amount set under the colluslve agreement. Stargeli's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to to tor is torits. (now) , while Schmida's profit is now Therefore, you can conclude that total industry proft when Stargell increases its output beyond the collusive quantity