station in life, and personal circumstances are all relevant Contract to this issue. An item sold to a minor is not considered a necessary if the minor's parent or guardian has already married minors and other emancipated minors than it is for unemancipated minors. 451 supplied him with similar items. For this reason, the range of items that will be considered necessaries is broader for The following Zelnick case involves a situation in which the court is challenged to determine whether a minor has been provided with a necessary. Zelnick v. Adams 606 S.E.2d 843 (Virginia Sup. Ct. 2009) The trust beneficiary filed a bill of complaint against his attorney for a declaration that the contract for legal services, entered (Va. Set. 2005). into when beneficiary was a minor, was void. The Circuit Court, Prince William County, Thomas A. Fortkort, J., granted sum- mary judgment voiding the contract, but the court awarded quantum meruit damages to the attorney. Both parties appealed Agee, Justice "A contract with an infant is not void, only voidable by the infant upon attaining the age of majority." Id. at 608, 561 S.E.2d at Jonathan introduced evidence that he was living a comfort- 715. When a plea of infancy is timely raised, as in this case, the able lifestyle in a middle class home and was not "necessitous." trial court makes a mixed inquiry of law and fact to ascertain He further argued that the suit filed by Zelnick was not necessary because his status as issue for purposes of distributions from the whether the defense applies to the case at hand. As we described trusts of Jonathan's grandfather, Cecil D. Hylton, Sr. (Mr. Hylton) in Zelnick I, the initial inquiry of the trial court is a matter of law: was settled by a Florida court's paternity order establishing "whether the 'things supplied' to the infant under a contract may Cecil D. Hylton, Jr. (Sonny) as his biological father. fall within the general class of necessaries." Id. If this first query In addition, Jonathan contended no legal action was necessary is answered in the affirmative, then the trial court proceeds to a during his minority because distributions under the trusts would second inquiry on a matter of fact: "whether there is sufficient not be made until 2014 and 2021, long after he was an adult. Ac- evidence to allow the finder of fact to determine whether the cordingly, Jonathan averred no prejudice could have occurred to things supplied were in fact necessary in the instant case." Id. him had Zelnick waited until Jonathan was 18 and obtained his Should this second inquiry also be answered in the affirmative, consent before proceeding with legal action against the trusts. then the trial court must resolve a third query, also one of fact, Further, Jonathan testified the legal proceedings prosecuted by which is "whether the 'things supplied' were actually necessary to Zelnick had harmed Jonathan because it exacerbated tensions the 'position and condition' of the infant"? Id. Should all three in- between Adams and Sonny thus adversely affecting him. quiries be answered in the affirmative, then the plea of infancy is In response, Zelnick contended the Florida court's paternity order was not determinative of Jonathan's status under the trusts. defeated and the infant is bound "under an implied contract to pay Moreover, Zelnick directed the trial court's attention to the fact what the goods or services furnished were reasonably worth." Id. that Mr. Hylton's will placed the decision as to Jonathan's sta- In Zelnick I, the trial court erroneously answered the first in- tus as issue for purposes of trust distributions within the pur- quiry in the negative because "a contract for legal services is within view of the trustees. Adams also communicated to Zelnick that the 'general classes of necessaries' that may defeat a plea of in- she feared payments were being made to some of Mr. Hylton's fancy." Id. at 611, 561 S.E.2d at 717. Although our decision defini- grandchildren through the trusts. tively answered the first inquiry as a matter of law, the prior record The trial court found that Zelnick's legal services were "in was without evidence upon which the trial court could answer the fact necessary" because Jonathan's status as issue of Mr. Hylton remaining questions of fact. See Id. at 612, 561 S.E.2d at 717-18. for purposes of trust distributions would not have been resolved We, therefore, remanded the case for the taking of such evidence as without legal proceedings to compel a resolution. Our inquiry, necessary to answer those questions. Id., 561 S.E.2d at 718. therefore, goes only to the final question of whether Zelnick's legal services were "actually necessary" to Jonathan's "position Upon remand, Jonathan Ray Adams (Jonathan) contended the and condition." As we indicated in Zelnick I, the answer to this legal services provided for him by Robert J. Zelnick (Zelnick), inquiry "must be determined by consideration of the circum- under the contract executed for Jonathan by his mother, Mildred stances at the time of rendering the services or providing the A. Adams (Adams) were not "in fact necessary." Alternatively, things in issue." Zelnick I, 263 Va. at 611, 561 S.E.2d at 717. even if Zelnick's legal services were necessary, Jonathan argued The record amply supports the trial court's determination. they were not "actually necessary to the 'position and condition Zelnick filed suit on Jonathan's behalf on May 15, 1997, when of the infant'" at the time rendered