Suppese tsaiah and Dalia form a cartel and behave as a mencpolist. The profic-maximizing price is per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, tsaiah and Dalia agree to split production equally. Therefore, 1saiah's profet is , and Dalia's profit is Suppose that ksaiah and Dalia have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the manopoly price and sell half of the monopoly quantity. Then one right before qoing to sleep, Isaiah says to himself, "Dalia and 1 aren't the best of friends anyway. If 1 increase my production to 45 galiont more than the cartel amount, l can increase my prefit even though her profit goes down. I wall do that sterting tomortow." After Isaiah implements his new plan, the price of water to and Dalia's profit becomes per gallon. Given Dalla and isalah's production levels, isaiah's preft becomes to per galion. Given Dalla and isalah's production leses, Becruse isalah has deviated from the cartel agreement and increased his output of wate Itat she will aiso increase her production to 45 gallons more than the cartel amount: After Dela increases her proguction, lsaiah's profit becomes of the prefits of Isaiah and Dalia) is now , Dalia's profit beccenes and total profit (the num True or false: aased on the foct that both Isaiah and Dalia increased preduction from the initial cartel quantity, you know that the output effect was. larger than the price effect at that quaneity. true false Iseiah and Dala have eoch cheated on their certel aprement and increased production by 45 gallons more than the cartel amount, Hibwevec, they Both reatie that if they continue to increase output beyand this ancunt, they'li each suffer a decrease in profit. (To see this for yourselt, consider isaibti' proft when he preduces 90 galions more whan the cartel arnount compared to his profit when he produces 45 gallons more than the cartel Suppese tsaiah and Dalia form a cartel and behave as a mencpolist. The profic-maximizing price is per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, tsaiah and Dalia agree to split production equally. Therefore, 1saiah's profet is , and Dalia's profit is Suppose that ksaiah and Dalia have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the manopoly price and sell half of the monopoly quantity. Then one right before qoing to sleep, Isaiah says to himself, "Dalia and 1 aren't the best of friends anyway. If 1 increase my production to 45 galiont more than the cartel amount, l can increase my prefit even though her profit goes down. I wall do that sterting tomortow." After Isaiah implements his new plan, the price of water to and Dalia's profit becomes per gallon. Given Dalla and isalah's production levels, isaiah's preft becomes to per galion. Given Dalla and isalah's production leses, Becruse isalah has deviated from the cartel agreement and increased his output of wate Itat she will aiso increase her production to 45 gallons more than the cartel amount: After Dela increases her proguction, lsaiah's profit becomes of the prefits of Isaiah and Dalia) is now , Dalia's profit beccenes and total profit (the num True or false: aased on the foct that both Isaiah and Dalia increased preduction from the initial cartel quantity, you know that the output effect was. larger than the price effect at that quaneity. true false Iseiah and Dala have eoch cheated on their certel aprement and increased production by 45 gallons more than the cartel amount, Hibwevec, they Both reatie that if they continue to increase output beyand this ancunt, they'li each suffer a decrease in profit. (To see this for yourselt, consider isaibti' proft when he preduces 90 galions more whan the cartel arnount compared to his profit when he produces 45 gallons more than the cartel