Suppose Country A constructs facilities for the development of nuclear weapons. Country A must decide whether or not to develop nuclear weapons. Country B must decide whether or not to bomb Country As new facilities. A third strategy makes use of intelligence information B obtains from spying on A. = probability that the intelligence is accurate.

a) In the solution of the weapons-development/pre-emptive-bombing game we studied in class, it cannot be an equilibrium for Country B to 100% make their bombo-bomb decision based on their spies report. Why not? In equilibrium, why must Country B randomize between unconditionally not bombing and following their spies report? [No math needed to answer this question. Please provide a verbal explanation only.] b) Let q be the probability that country B follows the spies advice, and let be the probability that the spies advice is accurate. In the solution of the weapons-development/pre-emptive- bombing game we studied in class, country Bs Nash equilibrium choice of q was decreasing in . Explain why. [No math needed to answer this question. Please provide a verbal explanation only.]

B: B