Suppose, for simplicity, that the appropriate discount rate for all cash flows is zero. A firm will be worth either e150, 000, 000 or e300, 000, 000 in the future. The management of the firm have better information than the investing public, and know which of these values will occur, with certainty; however, investors do not know, and believe the two possible outcomes each have probability of 0.5. Management is, for some reason, unable or unwilling to share their private information with the investing public. This firm has debt coming due in the future, with a face value of e110, 000, 000. There are 5, 000, 000 shares of equity in this firm. The firm has an investment opportunity, which will generate future cash flows which have present value of e65, 000, 000 (regardless of the value of the firms other assets). However, this investment requires initial expenditure of e50, 000, 000 (so the project has NPV of e15, 000, 000) today, and the firm does not have the necessary cash; it would have to go to financial markets to raise the e15, 000, 000 if it wants to do the project. Assume investors believe, since the project always has a positive NPV, that the firm will always issue new shares and do the project. H)Is investors belief that the firm will issue new shares and do the project only when the the existing assets are worth e150, 000, 000 justified? Explain briefly