Suppose India and Pakistan sign a treaty requiring both countries to stop building nuclear weapons. If both countries abide by the treaty, India receives a payoff of 9 and Pakistan receives a payoff of 12. If India cheats on the treaty while Pakistan abides by it, India receives a payoff of 15 and Pakistan receives a payoff of zero. If Pakistan cheats on the treaty while India abides by it, Pakistan receives a payoff of 15 while India receives a payoff of zero. If both countries cheat on the treaty, India receives a payoff of 6 while Pakistan receives a payoff of 3. a) Draw the strategic form game. b) Solve for the equilibrium of the game. Will India and Pakistan abide by the agreement? c) Suppose instead that the treaty is expected to be in force indefinitely into the future and that India and Pakistan receive the payoffs described each year the treaty is in force. The two countries know that if either country defects on the agreement the other country will punish the cheater by defecting in return. Assume that both countries' discount rates are 0.9. How many periods would India have to punish Pakistan in order to make compliance worth more to Pakistan than cheating? (Show your work) d) How many periods would Pakistan have to punish India in order to make compliance worth more to India than cheating? (Show your work) e) Explain why the answers you obtained in parts c and d are different. Be specific