Suppose Securitex is a small firm that has developed a new anti-theft device for automobiles. Securitex currently sells its device online and earns profit of $7 million per year. GM is considering Installing Securitex's system on its automobiles. The two firms first, however, must bargain over Accopt what price GM will pay Securitex for its software, GM: $5 SX $11 GM chooses how much to offer Securitex for its system and then Securitex chooses whether to accept the offer and install its system on GM's automobiles. The strategies and corresponding SX profits for GM (GM) and Securitex (SX) are depicted in the decision tree to the right. Profits are in High Price GM. SO milions, and GM's payoffs represent the additional profit it can eam on its automobiles with Securitex's anti-theft system. Reject IGM What is the subgame-perfect equilibrium? Accept GM. $10 A. The subgame-perfect equilibrium is for GM to offer a low price and for Securitex to reject Low Price SX the offer. GM SP ( B. A subgame-perfect equilibrium does not exist for this game. SX ST O C. The subgame-perfect equilibrium is for GM to offer a low price and for Securitex to Reject accept the offer. O D. The subgame-perfect equilibrium is for GM to offer a high price and for Securitex to accept the offer. OE The subgame-perfect equilibrium is for GM to offer a high price and for Secursex to reject the offer