Suppose that both players discount future payoffs with the same discount factor ? < 1. Suppose that both players play the "Cooperative Strategy;" namely, they play C in every period, no matter what was the outcome in the previous period. Do these strategies form a Nash Equilibrium of the repeated game? For what values of ? ? Do they form an SPNE for some values of ? ? Find them all.

6. Consider again the following infinitely repeated PD game we discussed in class: P1 C P2 C D 5,5 0,6 D 6,0 1,1 Suppose that both players discount future payoffs with the same discount factor 8 < 1. Suppose that both players play the "Cooperative Strategy;" namely, they play C in every period, no matter what was the outcome in the previous period. Do these strategies form a Nash Equilibrium of the repeated game? For what values of 8? Do they form an SPNE for some values of 8? Find them all.