Suppose that Flashfry and Warmbreeze are the only two firms in a hypothetical market that produce and sell air fryers. The following payoff matrix gives profit scenarios for each company (in millions of dollars), depending on whether it chooses to set a high or low price for fryers. Warmbreeze Pricing High Low High 10, 10 4, 19 Flashfry Pricing Low 19, 4 6, 6 For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Flashfry prices low and Warmbreeze prices high, Flashfry will earn a profit of $19 million, and Warmbreeze will earn a profit of $4 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Flashfry and Warmbreeze are both profit-maximizing firms. If Flashfry prices high, Warmbreeze will make more profit if it chooses a _ price, and if Flashfry prices low, Warmbreeze will make more profit if it chooses a price. If Warmbreeze prices high, Flashfry will make more profit if it chooses a price, and if Warmbreeze prices low, Flashfry will make more profit if it chooses a price. Considering all of the information given, pricing high a dominant strategy for both Flashfry and Warmbreeze. If the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing? Flashfry will choose a low price, and Warmbreeze will choose a high price. Flashfry will choose a high price, and Warmbreeze will choose a low price. Both Flashfry and Warmbreeze will choose a low price. Both Flashfry and Warmbreeze will choose a high price.True or False: The game between Flashfry and Warmbreeze is not an example of the prisoners' dilemma. O True O False