Suppose that Stark Real Estate (S) and Rogers Properties (R) are competing in a Stackelberg competition, where Rogers Properties (R) gets to move first. All of the information from the Cournot game still applies, including:

• Demand: P = 52 3Q
  • Q = Q_S + Q_R
• S's marginal costs: MC_S = 4
• R's marginal costs: MC_R = 10

What are the Stackelberg equilibrium quantities (Q_S and Q_R) and price in this market?

[Hint: What is the revenue function in terms of the quantity that R (Rogers) cares about? Remember that MR = dRev/dQ, or the change in revenue over the change in quantity. If Rev = aQ^b, then dRev/dQ= abQ^b-1. Also, Q = Q¹, and Q⁰ = 1]