Suppose that Symantec is a small firm that has developed$$ anti$-$virus computer software. Symantec currently earns $$$ million per year in profits from selling its software. Dell informs Symantec that it is considering installing the software on every new computer it sells. Dell currently earns profits of$$ $$30$ million but expects to sell more computers at a higher price if it can install$$ Symantec's software.

Part $2$

Dell first chooses whether to offer Symantec$$ $$30$ or$$ $$20$ for each copy of its$$ software, and then Symantec responds by either accepting or rejecting the offer. The strategies and corresponding profits$($in millions$)$ for Dell$($D$)$ and Symantec$($S$)$ are depicted in the decision tree to the right. What is the Nash equilibrium of the$$ game?

Part $3$

A$.$

Dell will offer$$ $$20$ per copy of the software and Symantec will accept the offer.

B$.$

Dell will offer$$ $$30$ per copy of the software and Symantec will reject the offer.

C$.$

Dell will offer$$ $$30$ per copy of the software and Symantec will accept the offer.

D$.$

Dell will offer$$ $$20$ per copy of the software and Symantec will reject the offer.