Suppose that the village of Mosirae is made up of 500 citizens, and the citizens decide whether to protest. The benefit for the protest is 50*m, where m is the number of citizens participating in the protest. The benefits of protests are shared by everyone who participates in the protests. Thus, the individual's benefit is 50*m. Suppose there are three types of people in society. There are 100 radicals in the village of Mosirae, and the cost of each protest is 6,000 per person. In addition, 100 moderates each incur a cost of 8,000 by protest. Finally, there are 300 bourgeois who are still backlashing, but they have the most to lose if the revolution fails. Therefore, the cost of participating in the protest is 20,000. If you do not participate in the protest, the payoff is zero. Remuneration for participation in protests is 50*m minus costs. Find the Nash Equilibrium.