Suppose that there are two political candidates who are about to choose one platform among 10 political platforms to compete for some electoral competition. That is, strategy set for candidate is = {1,2, ,10} for i = 1,2. For example, Platform 1 could refer to the most leftist agenda and Platform 10 could refer to the most rightist agenda. There are 100 voters who are uniformly distributed across the platforms, that is, there are 10 voters whose ideal political platform is 1, there are 10 voters whose ideal political platform is 2, and so on. The voters are voting for candidates whose chosen platform is the closest to their ideal platform. If two candidates are positioned at equal distance to a platform, then ties are broken randomly with equal probability. (Half of the voters in that platform vote for one of the candidates, and the other half vote for the other candidate). Perform iterated elimination of dominated strategies and argue whether the game is dominance solvable