Suppose that there are two types of workers: Group A (high skill) and Group B (low skill). Variable y represents the number of years of education. For workers in Group A (high skill) the cost of attaining an educational level y is CA(y)=$10y; for workers in Group B (low skill) the cost of attaining an educational level y is CB(y)=$16y. The worker's skill is private information (only the worker knows her own skill). The firms can observe the years of education of a worker but not her skill. Suppose that firms are advertising the following jobs. If a worker has y=3 years of education or more, then the worker will receive a wage $80. If the worker has less than y=3 years of education, then the worker will receive a wage $40. Workers can choose whether to go to school for y=3 years and then obtain the higher wage or choose not to go to school (y=0) and obtain the lower wage job. Select True of False for each statement. 1) Workers in Group A (high skill) will choose to go to school for y=3 years. 2) Workers in Group B (low skill) will choose not to go to school (y=0). 3) Firms can use y=3 years of education as a market signal of the skill of the workers