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Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by C1=60Q1 and C2=60Q2?,

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Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by C1=60Q1 and C2=60Q2?, where Q1 is the output of Firm 1 and Q2 is the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand?curve:

P=900?Q

where Q=Q1+Q2.

Find the?Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium. ?(For all of the?following, enter a numeric response rounded to two decimal?places.)

When?competing, each firm will produce

nothing

units of output.??

In?turn, each firm will earn profit of ?$

nothing

.

Suppose the two firms form a cartel to maximize joint profits. How many widgets will be?produced? Calculate each?firm's profit.

Each firm will produce

nothing

units of output.

In?turn, each firm will earn profit of ?$

nothing

.

Suppose Firm 1 were the only firm in the industry. How would market output and Firm?1's profit differ from that found in?above?

Firm 1 would produce

nothing

units of output.

Firm?1's would earn profit of ?$

nothing

.

Returning to the duopoly?above, suppose Firm 1 abides by the agreement but Firm 2 cheats by increasing production. How many widgets will firm?produce? What will be each?firm's profits?

Firm 2 would cheat by producing

nothing

units of output.

As a?consequence, Firm 1 would earn profit of

nothing

.

Firm 2 would earn profit of ?$

nothing

.

Enter your answer in each of the answer boxes.

image text in transcribedimage text in transcribed
Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by C, =60Q, and C2 =60Q2, where Q, is the output of Firm 1 and Q2 is the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve P = 900 - Q where Q = Q1 + Q2- Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium. (For all of the following, enter a numeric response rounded to two decimal places.) When competing, each firm will produce | units of output. In turn, each firm will earn profit of $]. Suppose the two firms form a cartel to maximize joint profits. How many widgets will be produced? Calculate each firm's profit. Each firm will produce units of output. In turn, each firm will earn profit of $ Suppose Firm 1 were the only firm in the industry. How would market output and Firm 1's profit differ from that found in above? Firm 1 would produce | units of output. Firm 1's would earn profit of $ Returning to the duopoly above, suppose Firm 1 abides by the agreement but Firm 2 cheats by increasing production. How many widgets will firm produce? What will be each firm's profits? Enter your answer in each of the answer boxes.In turn, each firm will earn profit of $ Suppose the two firms form a cartel to maximize joint profits. How many widgets will be produced? Calculate each firm's profit. Each firm will produce units of output. In turn, each firm will earn profit of $ Suppose Firm 1 were the only firm in the industry. How would market output and Firm 1's profit differ from that found in above? Firm 1 would produce units of output. Firm 1's would earn profit of $ Returning to the duopoly above, suppose Firm 1 abides by the agreement but Firm 2 cheats by increasing production. How many widgets will firm produce? What will be each firm's profits? Firm 2 would cheat by producing | units of output. As a consequence, Firm 1 would earn profit of Firm 2 would earn profit of $

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