Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player 1 can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player 2 can choose either Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table: Player 2 Left Right Player 1 Top 1 2 9 Bottom 6 4 5 3 where the number on the left is the payoff to Player 1, and the number on the right is the payoff to Player 2. A) (2 points) Does Player 1 have a dominant strategy, and if so what is it? [ Select ] B) (2 points) Does Player 2 have a dominant strategy and if so what is it? [ Select ] C) (1 point each) For each of the following strategy combinations, select TRUE if it is a Nash Equilibrium, and FALSE if it is not . i) Top/Left [ Select ] ii) Top/Right [ Select ] iii) Bottom/Left [Select ] . iv) Bottom Right [ Select] D) (2 points) What is Player 1's maximin strategy? [ Select] E) (2 points) What is Player 2's maximin strategy? [ Select ] F) (2 points) If the game were played with Player 1 moving first and Player 2 moving second, using the backward induction method we went over in class, what strategy will each player choose? [ Select ]