Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player 1 can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player 2 can choose either Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table: Player 1Player 2 Left Right Top 6 5 9 6 Bottom 4 8 5 3 where the number on the left is the payoff to Player 1, and the number on the right is the payoff to Player 2. A) (2 points) Does Player 1 have a dominant strategy, and if so what is it? B) (2 points) Does Player 2 have a dominant strategy and if so what is it? C) (1 point each) For each of the following strategy combinations, select TRUE if it is a Nash Equilibrium, T. and FALSE if it is not: i) Top/Left ii) Top/Right iii) Bottom/Left iv) Bottom Right ' D) (2 points) What is Player 1's maximin strategy? E) (2 points) What is Player 2's maximin strategy? F) (2 points) If the game were played with Player 1 moving first and Player 2 moving second, using the backward induction method we went over in class, what strategy will each player choose