Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player 1 can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player 2 can choose either Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table:

Player 1	Player 2
	Left	Right
Top	35	93
Bottom	74	55

where the number on the left is the payoff to Player 1, and the number on the right is the payoff to Player 2. A) (2 points) Does Player 1 have a dominant strategy, and if so what is it? [ Select ] ["Yes; Top", "Yes; Bottom", "Yes; Left", "Yes; Right", "No; Player 1 does not have a dominant strategy"] B) (2 points) Does Player 2 have a dominant strategy and if so what is it? [ Select ] ["Yes; Top", "Yes; Bottom", "Yes; Left", "Yes; Right", "No; Player 2 does not have a dominant strategy"] C) (1 point each) For each of the following strategy combinations, select TRUE if it is a Nash Equilibrium, and FALSE if it is not:

• i) Top/Left [ Select ] ["True", "False"]
• ii) Top/Rightv [ Select ] ["True", "False"]
• iii) Bottom/Left [ Select ] ["True", "False"]
• iv) Bottom Right [ Select ] ["True", "False"]

D) (2 points) What is Player 1's maximin strategy? [ Select ] ["Top", "Bottom", "Left", "Right", "Player 1 does not have a maximin strategy"] E) (2 points) What is Player 2's maximin strategy? [ Select ] ["Top", "Bottom", "Left", "Right", "Player 2 does not have a maximin strategy"] F) (2 points) If the game were played with Player 1 moving first and Player 2 moving second, using the backward induction method we went over in class, what strategy will each player choose?