Suppose that we are studying a firm that produces cars, and they exist in an oligopoly. Specifically, there are two firms in the market which produce cars that are basically identical. They are so close that they face they both share the same market demand. Suppose that market demand is given by: p = 200 - 0.50 And assume (for simplicity) that both firms have a constant marginal cost of $10, with zero fixed costs. Each firm has to decide between two prices they could set, which are either (i) $105 or (ii) $60. If both firms choose the same price, then they split the market (i.e. they each produce half of the market demand and earn the revenue for those units), If the two firms choose different prices, then the firm with the lowest price takes all of the market demand at that price, and the firm with the highest price produces nothing (i.e. Q = 0). 5. Fill in the following payoffs in the payoff matrix for this game. Show your work. [ Note: the payoffs should be profits for both firms in each of the four possible outcomes] Firm B $60 $105 A: A: $60 B: B: Firm A $105 A: A: B: B: 6. Is $105 the profit-maximizing price to set for a monopolist? How do you know? i.e. show your work. 7. Which outcomes, if any, are Nash Equilibria? How do you know