Suppose the following stage game is repeated infinitely: M R T 8,10 6,8 12,4 C 8,2 7,4 8,1 D 10,9 4,9 11,9 Select every of the following statements that is true. O The strategy profile which assigns (D,L) to every history h, for which t is an even number and (C,M) to every history h for which t is an odd number is a Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. ( The strategy profile which assigns (T.L) to every history h, for which t is an even number and (D,R) to every history h, for which t is an odd number is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. The strategy profile which assigns (D.R) to every history h, for which t is an even number and (T,L) to every history h, for which & is an odd number is a Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. The strategy profile which assigns (C,M) to every history h, for which t is an even number and (D,L) to every history h, for which t is an odd number is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game