Suppose the market demand for cell phones is given by P = 500 - Q, and that there are only two firms in the industry (Motorola and Nokia), both of which have constant average and marginal costs: ACM = MCM = 20 and ACN = MCN = 25, respectively. a. Suppose the two firms competed as Cournot duopolists. Derive the two firms' reaction functions and find the equilibrium output per firm, price, and profits per firm. b. If Motorola were a Stackelberg leader, what would be the equilibrium output per firm, price, and profits per firm? c. If Motorola and Nokia were to merge as one company, what would be the equilibrium output produced, price, and profits? d. If the two firms competed as price takers, what would be the equilibrium output per firm, price, and profits per firm? e. If the two firms competed as Bertrand duopolists, what would be the equilibrium output per firm, price, and profits per firm? f. Summarize the above results by ranking the different models according to industry output produced.