Suppose the owner of a used car has a valuation vS for that car, which is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0,1]. There is a potential buyer for that car whose valuation is vB=1.5vS. Only the seller knows vS. Suppose there is an exogenously given price p for the car that the buyer pays and the seller receives if they decide to trade. For which values of the given price p will there be trade in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium? Justify your answer. Suppose the owner of a used car has a valuation vS for that car, which is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0,1]. There is a potential buyer for that car whose valuation is vB=1.5vS. Only the seller knows vS. Suppose there is an exogenously given price p for the car that the buyer pays and the seller receives if they decide to trade. For which values of the given price p will there be trade in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium? Justify your