Suppose there are n firms in a Cournot oligopoly. Inverse demande is given by P(Q)=a-Q, where Q = q1 + ..... + qn. Consider the infinitely repeated game based in this stage game. 1. What is the lowest value of such the firms can use trigger stategies to substain the monpoly output level in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium? 2. How does the answer vary with n, and why? 3. If is too small for the firms to use trigger strategies to sustain the monopoly output, what is the most-profitable symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium that can be sustained using trigger strategies?Suppose there are n firms in a Cournot oligopoly. Inverse demande is given by P(Q)=a-Q, where Q = q1 + ..... + qn. Consider the infinitely repeated game based in this stage game. 1. What is the lowest value of such the firms can use trigger stategies to substain the monpoly output level in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium? 2. How does the answer vary with n, and why? 3. If is too small for the firms to use trigger strategies to sustain the monopoly output, what is the most-profitable symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium that can be sustained using trigger strategies?Suppose there are n firms in a Cournot oligopoly. Inverse demande is given by P(Q)=a-Q, where Q = q1 + ..... + qn. Consider the infinitely repeated game based in this stage game. 1. What is the lowest value of such the firms can use trigger stategies to substain the monpoly output level in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium? 2. How does the answer vary with n, and why? 3. If is too small for the firms to use trigger strategies to sustain the monopoly output, what is the most-profitable symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium that can be sustained using trigger strategies?Suppose there are n firms in a Cournot oligopoly. Inverse demande is given by P(Q)=a-Q, where Q = q1 + ..... + qn. Consider the infinitely repeated game based in this stage game. 1. What is the lowest value of such the firms can use trigger stategies to substain the monpoly output level in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium? 2. How does the answer vary with n, and why? 3. If is too small for the firms to use trigger strategies to sustain the monopoly output, what is the most-profitable symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium that can be sustained using trigger strategies?Suppose there are n firms in a Cournot oligopoly. Inverse demande is given by P(Q)=a-Q, where Q = q1 + ..... + qn. Consider the infinitely repeated game based in this stage game. 1. What is the lowest value of such the firms can use trigger stategies to substain the monpoly output level in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium? 2. How does the answer vary with n, and why? 3. If is too small for the firms to use trigger strategies to sustain the monopoly output, what is the most-profitable symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium that can be sustained using trigger strategies?