Suppose there are two rms in a market who each simultaneously choose a quantity. Firm 1's quantity is ql, and Firm 2's quantity is {12. Therefore the market quantity is Q = q1 + q2. The market demand curve is given by P = 150 - 3Q. Also, each rm has constant marginal cost equal to 6. There are no xed costs. The marginal revenue of the two rms are given by: 0 MR1 = 150 - 6C]1 - 3C]2 0 MR2 = 150 - 3'11 - 6Q2. A) How much output will each rm produce in the Cournot equilibrium? Firm 1 will produce units. Firm 2 will produce units. B) What will be the market price of the good? The market price of the good will be 35 C) What is the deadweight loss that results from this duopoly? The deadweight loss from this duopoly will be $ D) How much prot does each rm make? Firm 1 will make a prot of $ Firm 2 will make a prot of $ E) Suppose Firm 2 produced 20 units of output. How much output should Firm 1 produce in order to maximize prot? Firm 1 should produce units