Suppose two competitors, VIVATEL and CANODAL, each face an important strategic decision concerning whether they should boost research and development (R&D) spending on new processor designs. VIVATEL can choose either row in the payoff matrix defined below, whereas CANODAL can choose either column. For VIVATEL, the choice is either "boost R&D" or "hold R&D constant;" for CANODAL the choices are the same. Notice that neither firm can unilaterally choose a given cell in the profit payoff matrix. The ultimate result of this one-shot, simultaneous-move game depends upon the choices made by both competitors. In this payoff matrix, the first number in each cell is the profit payoff to VIVATEL (in billions); the second number is the profit payoff to CANODAL (in billions).

		CANODAL
VIVATEL	Competitive Strategy	Boost R&D	Hold R&D Constant
	Boost R&D	$8 billion; $7 billion	$7.5 billion; $6 billion
	Hold R&D Constant	$4 billion; $5 billion	$6 billion; $5.5 billion

Is there a dominant strategy for VIVATEL? If so, what is it? Explain.

Is there a dominant strategy for CANODAL? If so, what is it? Explain.

Is there a secure strategy for VIVATEL? If so, what is it? Explain.

Is there a secure strategy for CANODAL? If so, what is it? Explain.

Is there a Nash equilibrium? Explain.