Suppose you know the following for a particular three$-$player game: The space of strategy profiles S is finite. Also, for every s S$,$ it is the case that u$2($s$)=3$u$1($s$),$ u$3($s$)=[$u$1($s$)]2,$ and u$1($s$)[0,1].($a$)$ Must this game have a Nash equilibrium? Explain your answer. $($b$)$ Must this game have an efficient Nash equilibrium? Explain youranswer. $($c$)$ Supposethatinadditiontotheinformationgivenabove,youknowthats$*$ is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Must s$*$ be an efficient strat$-$ egy profile? Explain your answer; if you answer no$,$ then provide a counterexample.