Supreme Court Case: gregg v. Georgia

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Sample Brief previously submitted by a student in BUAD 3470, I. KELOetal v. CITY OF NEW LONDON et al. II. CITATION: 545 U.S. 469 (2005) III. FACTS: The city of New London, Connecticut, after the closing of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, reactivated the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a non-profit entity for land development in the city, specifically the Fort Trumbull area vacated by the U.S. Navy | Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Inc. expressed an interest in locating a research and production facility in the area. The city advised the NLDC to move forward with its plans. Over 90 acres of property were purchased and acquired thmu@ eminent domain for the dmnpment of residential housing, recreational, the remainder from private owners. All private owners, except 15, sold to the city for the project. The remaining 15 held out not for money, but for emotional and sentimental reasons. The Supreme Court of Connecticut muled in favor of the taking of the private property under eminent domain. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and grouped all 15 cases in one appeal. IV. LEGAL ISSUES: Is the use of eminent domain to acquire property by the government and redirect for private use repugnant to the Fifth Amendment of the U S_ Constitution which reads \"___nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation? Is the taking of property from A and giving it to B for economic development a \"public use under the Fifth Amendment? V. COURT DECISION: Tn a 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Connecticut Supreme. Justices Stevens, Eennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer were in majority with Justices O' Connor, Rehnaquist, Scalia, and Thomas dissenting. V1. OPINION AND REASONING OF THE COURT: (by Justice Stevens) The majonty opimton and decision of the court was delivered by Justice Stevens. The majornity upmmn was primarily based on two previous court rulings, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. 467 1U.S. 2 (1984) and Bermarn v. Parker, 346 U.S. 26 (1954). In both cases the local government took pmperty through emminent domain and redistributed 1t to private entitites for development and urban renewal. The majonty opimon held that the New London land in question 1s part of a \"carefully considered development plan. The opinion conceded that, \"The sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A 1s paid just compensation However, because the taking iz part of a development plan and not just an arbitrary re-distribution of property, this makes it acceptable. The lower courts had found that there was no evidence of illegitimate purpose in this case, that the taking of the property was not for the sole benefit of one person. And while the land 15 not freely accessible to all, the New London project sufficiently satisfies the \"public use requirement of the emminent domain clause of the Fifth Amendment. The duty of the court is to determine 1f the \"public VI. OPINION AND REASONING OF THE COURT: (by Justice Stevens) The majority opinion and decision of the court was delivered by Justice Stevens. The majority opinion was primarily based on two previous court rulings, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) and Berman v. Parker, 346 U.S. 26 (1954). In both cases the local government took property through emminent domain and redistributed it to private entitites for development and urban renewal. The majority opinion held that the New London land in question is part of a "carefully considered" development plan. The opinion conceded that, "The sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation." However, because the taking is part of a development plan and not just an arbitrary re-distribution of property, this makes it acceptable. The lower courts had found that there was no evidence of illegitimate purpose in this case, that the taking of the property was not for the sole benefit of one person. And while the land is not freely accessible to all, the New London project sufficiently satisfies the "public use" requirement of the emmiment domain clause of the Fifth Amendment. The duty of the court is to determine if the "public use" requirement is being met. The majority quoted Justice Douglas in the Berman v. Parker case, stating, "We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive." The duty of the court is not to look at each individual building, but at the project as a whole and determine if it meets the "public use" guideline. Individual property is the concern of the local legislature which is in a better position to review each property and its relation to the project as a whole. VIL. CONCURRING OPINION (delivered by Justice Kennedy) Justice Kennedy called for a rational-basis review eminent domain cases to determine if one particular party will benefit greatly over others. Such a review was outlined in both the Hawaii Housing Authority and Berman cases. However, in the New London case, the majority of the parties were unknown and no one party could unfairly benefit from the transaction. Pfizer was not benefitting from the development as the project was already conceived and being executed when Pfizer expressed an interest in locating there. The land transfers were part of a comprehensive plan that was already in the works, and no one group was favored in the transactionVIII. DISSENTING OPINION (delivered by Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia) Justice O'Connor gave a very strong dissent. Referring to the words of Justice Chase in 1798 who wrote: "An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legilative authority... A law that takes property from A and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice for the people to entrust a Legislature with such power; and, therefore it cannot be presumes that they have done it." Calder v. Bull 3 Dall.386,388 (1798) Justice O'Connor wrote, "Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner so long as it might be upgraded." Justice O'Connor proposes a limited Constitutionalist view of eminent domain holding that property taken under the Fifth Amendment must be strictly for public use and in no way should benefit any single or limited group of people. The taking of property must be for the good of all people equally. Justice O'Connor laid out three primary areas where emminent domain has come into play. First, to acquire land for roads, a hospital, or a military base. The second to acquire land such as a railroad, public utility, and public stadium. The third is for certain private enterprises such as in the Hawaii Housing Authority and Berman cases. In these two cases there were extenuating circumstances. In Berman, the area was so blighted as to be a health hazard. In Hawaii Housing Authority, the majority of the land was in the hands of so few people, it was "skewing" the state's residential fee simple market. In both cases the public good was being served without unduly benefiting a select group of individuals. O'Connor said it is the role of the court to determine whether transfers are solely for the benefit of a private transferee. Also, eminent domain is to upgrade and not downgrade property. She agreed that the real power of eminent domain should rest with local and state legislature, but it should be done with a watchful eye by the courts because "the beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process." Justice O'Connor concluded that the taking of the New London property was unconstitutional and that the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings IX. SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE THOMAS Justice Thomas said that the "public use" clause of the Fifth Amendment has been erased from our Constitution. The "public use" clause along with the "just compensation" clause in the Fifth Amendment are an express limit on the government's power of eminent domain.IX. SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE THONMAS Justice Thomas said that the \"public use\" clause of the Fifth Amendment has been erased from our Constitution. The \"public vse clause along with the \"just compensation clause in the Fifth Amendment are an express limit on the government's power of eminent domain. He pointed out that \"public use is very different from \"general welfare used elsewhere in the Constitution. These takings fall more in line with \"general welfare than \"public use. Justice Thomas looks on the \"takings clause as not a grant of power but a prolubition, and that takings should only be gave compensation to landowners whose land was flooded by water powered grist mills. The taking later moved to public roads, ferries, canals, railways, and parks, all within the scope of \"public use.\" The current interpretation of \"public use has deviated from its natural reading to two lines of cases. The first are those that adopt the \"public purpose interpretation, and the second are those that defer to the legislature judgment regarding valid public purpose. Justice Thomas criticized the \"actual use tests that were laid out in both the Hawaii Housing duthority and Berman cases. Once applied there 15 no limit on what constitutes \"public use\" He argued that the results of the present decision are easy to predict. The neighborhoods of the less affluent and less influential of society will be the target of hastily drawn revitalization programs and the takings will be the rewards of the faw rather than the public good. He urged the Supreme Court to return to the original intent envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, that 1s to restrain and prohibit the arbitrary taking of property. X. PERSONAL OPINION BY STUDENT I agree with the dissenters in this case. The Constitution 13 clear that the government should not take land unnecessarily, and moreover for the benefit of private individuals. This harkens back as far as the original Magna Charta. The sovereign shall not disposess people from therr land or property. The path that this leads down 1s one where the most influential in our society can take whatever thety like with the blessings of the court under the guise of \"public use.\" It 1s easy to see from the cases cited and the dates, that the more recent the case, the more liberal the intrepretation of \"public use Search: CASES [ JUSTICES / ADVOCATES / BENEFACTORS f HELP SCOTUSblog / Justia / Appellate.Net f On the Docket Home Decades 1970-1979 1975 Gregg v. Georgia Gregg v. Georgia Case Media Docket: T4-6257 Oral Argument Citation: 428 U5 153 I19T6} Opmmn Announcement Petitioner: Gregg Written Opinion Respondent: Georgia Abstract Advocates Oral Wednesday. March 31, 1976 Raobert H. Bork (Argued the cause for the United States as Argument: amicus curiae) Decision: Friday, July 2, 1976 G. Thomas (Argued the cause for the respondent) Issues: Criminal Procedure, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Death Penalty Davis Categories: capital punishment, criminal, cruel and unusual punishment, eighth G. Hughel (By appointment of the Court, argued the amendment Harrizon cause for the petitionar) Facts of the Case A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a "cruel and unusual\" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with Jurek v. Texas, Roberts v. Louisiana, Proffitt v. Florida, and Woadson v. North Carolina. Question Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual\" punishment? Conclusion MNo. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately Killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders. This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with Jurek v. Texas, Roberts v. Louisiana, Proffitt v. Florida, and Woodson v. North Carolina. Question Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual\" punishment? Conclusion MNo. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately Killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders. Supreme Court Justice Opinions and Votes (by Seniority) 'Sort by ldeclogy {More information here) Judgment of the Court: Criminal Procedure, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Death Penalty: 7 - 2 N B :1' g 1 ' ' i ; A : A - v, _ - ' e A = . M 5 . & Brennan i Cite this page The OYEZ Project, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.5. 153 (1976), available at: