Albert Schoux worked as a supervisor for Royal Electric Company, and Ted Choate worked as a supervisor for Nutter Electric Company. Both were members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), and neither of their employers had collective bargaining agreements with the IBEW. The union found that both individuals had violated the union’s constitution by working for employers who did not have contracts with the union and fined Schoux $8,200 and Choate $6,000. The employers filed Section 8(b)(1)(B) unfair labor charges. The Board entered an order against the union, but the court of appeals refused to enforce the order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

BRENNAN, J.…

I.

The question for decision is whether a union “restrain[s] or coerce[s] … an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances,” 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(1)(B), when it disciplines a supervisor union member who does not participate in collective bargaining or adjust contractual grievances, and whose employer has not entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the union.

II.

The structure of the NLRA reveals that in § 8(b)(1)(B) Congress addressed “a separate and far more limited problem than that of conflict of loyalties.” Florida Power, 417 U.S., at 811, n. 21. One need only compare the scope of § 8(b)(1)(B) with that of other sections of the Act: § 8(b)(1)(B) covers only individuals selected as the employer’s representatives “for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances,” while the total class of supervisors “is defined by § 2(11) to include individuals engaged in a substantially broader range of activities.” 417 U.S., at 811, n. 21….

We conclude that the union discipline at issue was not an unfair labor practice. Although both Schoux and Choate were supervisors within the meaning of § 2(11), neither had grievance adjustment or collective bargaining responsibilities protected by § 8(b)(1)(B). The possibility that a § 2(11) supervisor might someday perform § 8(b)(1)(B) functions and that past discipline might then have an adverse effect on the performance of such duties is simply too speculative to support a finding that an employer has been “restrained] or coerce[d]” “in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bar gaining or the adjustment of grievances.”

III.

The Court of Appeals found, as a matter of law, that the Union did not have a collective bargaining relationship with Royal or Nutter, and that it did not seek to represent their employees in the future. It held that such a finding precluded union liability for violation of § 8(b)(1)(B). The NLRB argues, however, that even under these circumstances, the Union’s enforcement of its no-contract-no-work rule against its supervisor-members would restrain or coerce Royal and Nutter by affecting the way in which the supervisor-members performed their § 8(b)(1)(B) tasks and by restricting the selection of § 8(b)(1)(B) representatives…. [W]e find that the absence of a collective bargaining relationship between the union and the employer, like the absence of § 8(b)(1)(B) responsibilities in a disciplined supervisor-member, makes the possibility that the Union’s discipline of Schoux and Choate will coerce Royal and Nutter too attenuated to form the basis of an unfair labor practice charge….

Both the structure of the NLRA and recent developments in its interpretation suggest that employers are no longer restrained or coerced in their selection of representatives by union discipline of supervisor-members. The statute itself reveals that it is the employer, not the supervisor-member, who is protected from coercion by the statutory scheme. It is difficult to maintain that an employer is restrained or coerced because a union member must accept union expulsion or other discipline to continue in a supervisory position. The employer’s problem—that the supervisor-member might decline to serve as a representative or align with the union during a strike and deprive the employer of services—is of its own making. A dissenting member of the Board has said:

“Having been afforded the opportunity to refuse to hire union members as supervisors, the opportunity to discharge supervisors for involvement in union affairs, the opportunity to incorporate into a collective-bargaining agreement the permissible extent of a supervisor-member’s functioning during a strike and, indeed, the opportunity to provide additional incentives making it worthwhile for all union members to forfeit union benefits upon taking supervisory positions, the employer, having forsaken such opportunities, cannot now be heard to argue that the union is affecting its selection of the very grievance adjustment or collective bargaining representative it permits to retain union membership.” New York Typographical Union No. 6 (Triangle Publications), 216 N.L.R.B. 896, 901 (1975) (Member Fanning, dissenting)….

… Recently this Court decided in Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985), that union members have a right to resign from a union at any time and avoid imposition of union discipline. The employer may order its representatives to leave the union immediately and there is no barrier to a supervisor-member’s obedience to that order. The very least that may be derived from Pattern Makers is that union rules or discipline that merely diminish an employer-representative’s willingness to serve no longer restrain or coerce the employer in its selection of a § 8(b)(1)(B) representative.

IV.

Section 8(b)(1)(B) was enacted to protect the integrity of the process of grievance adjustment and collective bargaining—two private dispute resolution systems on which the national labor laws place a high premium. Although some union discipline might impermissibly affect the manner in which a supervisor-member carries out § 8(b)(1)(B) tasks or coerce the employer in its selection of a § 8(b)(1)(B) representative, union discipline directed at supervisor-members without § 8(b)(1)(B) duties, working for employers with whom the union neither has nor seeks a collective bargaining relationship, cannot and does not adversely affect the performance of § 8(b)(1)(B) duties. Consequently, such union action does not coerce the employer in its selection of § 8(b)(1)(B) representatives. The order of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is therefore

Affirmed.

Were Schoux and Choate Section 8(b)(1)(B) supervisors?