Table 2 shows Excalibur lnternet's demand table, total revenue, and marginal revenue at each price. What is the quantity effect of reducing the price from $130 to $100? Table 2 Demand Schedule and Calculated Revenue Price * mount Total Marginal Demanded Revenue Revenue $160 I $0 n/a $130 $16,250 $130.00 $100 $25,000 $70.00 $75 $35,625 $47.22 $40 $25,000 $70.83 $0 $142.86 |:\\._./:l a} $3750 'i\\._.,3' b} $12,500 f. '3\\--?' C) 525,000 [9' C\" $12,500 i:_:] 6) -$3,750 Excalibur Internet: a typical utilitybased monopoly: provides internet service in a local community. Table 1 shows the demand that Excalibur Internet experiences at each price. Graph 1 depicts Excalibur lnternet's demand curve. Why does such a monopoly face a downward sloping demand curve? Table 1 Demand Schedule Graph 1: Monthly Demand for Internet Service Subscriptions $200 I $130 . 0' mo $130 . _ ma - \"5- \"3 . I $120 ' 250. 3100 Price $100- !?5. 575 $30 - 580' 625.840 _ $40. $2\" ' sun. so $000 aloud"x$1@1@a$369s9u@asai16\"epa9$d Amount Demanded O a) More people are willing to pay the higher price offered. If they are offering the internet service for $160, then many people will want to take advantage of that. O b} More people are willing to pay for the internet service as the price increases. 0 c) Fewer people are willing to pay a lower price: and Excalibur Internet is willing to provide more service at the lower price. 0 cl) Excalibur Internet is the only producer of internet in this market: so its demand curve is the market demand curve for the entire industry. 0 e} The price Excalibur Internet expects to receive for its output remains constant as output increases. Table B Pricing Matrix shows the pricing options for two car mechanics: Angela and Tom: operating in an oligopoly market. Which ofthe following pricing strategy scenarios does Table 10 depict: when there are at least two pricing periods expected? Table B Mechanic Angela LOW Mechanic Angela HIGH Pricing Price Price Matrix Mechanic Mechanic Angela Charges Mechanic Angela Charges Torn LOW LOW Price: gets $200 profit HIGH Price: gets $0 profit Price Mechanic Torn Charges Mechanic Tom Charges LOW Price: gets $200 profit LOW Price: gets $800 profit Mechanic Mechanic Angela Charges Mechanic Angela Charges Torn HIGH LOW Price: gets $800 profit HIGH Price: gets $400 Price Mechanic Torn Charges profit Mechanic Torn HIGH Price: gets $0 profit Charges HIGH Price: gets $400 profit Table 10 Pricing Strategy Scenario Table 10 First First Second Second Total Period Period Period Period Profit for Price Profit Price Profit Both Choice Choice Periods (High or (High or Low) Low) Mechanic High $400 High $400 $800 Angela Mechanic High $400 High $400 $800 Tom a) Mechanic Tom plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Mechanic Angela "cheats." b) Mechanic Tom plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Mechanic Angela plays "Tit-for-Tat." c) Mechanic Angela plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Mechanic Tom "cheats." O d) Mechanic Angela "cheats" and Mechanic Tom "cheats." O e) When there is only a single period in which to choose and Mechanic Tom does not know what Mechanic Angela will do, Mechanic Tom chooses the Nash Non-cooperative Equilibrium price strategy.Table A shows the pricing options for two drone operators, Andrew and Jasmine: as an oligopoly in a local market. Which of the following pricing strategy scenarios does Table l depict: when there is only ONE pricing period expected? Table A Drone Operator Andrew Drone Operator Andrew LOW Price HIGH Price Drone Drone Operator Andrew Drone Operator Andrew Operator Charges LOW Price: gets Charges HIGH Price: gets $0 Jasmine LOW $1,000 profit Drone profit Drone Operator Price OperatorJasmine Charges Jasmine Charges LOW Price: LOW Price: gets $1,000 gets $2,000 profit profit Drone Drone Operator Andrew Drone Operator Andrew Operator Charges LOW Price: gets Charges HIGH Price: gets Jasmine $2,000 profit Drone $1,500 profit Drone HIGH Price Operator Jasmine Charges Operator Jasmine Charges HIGH Price: gets $0 profit HIGH Price: gets $1.500 profit Table 1 Pricing Strategy Scenario TABLE 1 First Period First Period Price Choice Profit (High or Low) Andrew High $0 Jasmine Low $2,000 O a) Jasmine plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Andrew plays "Tit-for-Tat." Ob) Jasmine chooses the Nash Noncooperative Equilibrium price strategy because it is the safest choice. c) Jasmine plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Andrew chooses the "Low" price. O d) Andrew "cheats" and Jasmine "cheats." O e) Andrew chooses the Nash Noncooperative Equilibrium price strategy because it is the safest choice.Table A shows the pricing options for two drone operators, Andrew and .Jasrnine, as an oligopoly in a local market. Which of the following pricing strategy scenarios does Table 3 depict, when there are at least two pricing periods expected? Table A Drone Operator Andrew Drone Operator Andrew LOW Price HIGH Price Drone Drone Operator Andrew Drone Operator Andrew Operator Charges LOW Price: Charges HIGH Price: gets Jasmine LOW gets $1,000 profit $0 profit Drone Operator Price Drone Operator Jasmine Jasmine Charges LOW Charges LOW Price: Price: gets $2.000 prot gets $1,000 profit Drone Drone Operator Andrew Drone Operator Andrew Operator Charges LOW Price: Charges HIGH Price: gets Jasmine gets $2,000 profit $1,500 profit Drone HIGH Price Drone Operator Jasmine Operator Jasmine Charges Charges HIGH Price: gets $0 profit HIGH Price: gets $1.500 profit Table 3 Pricing Strategy Scenario Table 3 First Period First Second Second Total Profit Price Choice Period Period Price Period in both (High or Profit Choice (High Profit periods Low) or Low) Andrew High $0 Low $1,000 $1,000 Jasmine Low $2,000 Low $1,000 $3,000 a) Andrew plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Jasmine plays "Tit-for-Tat." O b) Andrew plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Jasmine "cheats." c) Jasmine plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Andrew "cheats." O d) Jasmine "cheats" and Andrew "cheats." O e) Andrew does not know what Jasmine will do, so Andrew chooses the Nash Noncooperative Equilibrium price strategy.Table A shows the pricing options for two drone operators, Andrew and Jasmine, as an oligopoly in a local market. Which of the following pricing strategy scenarios does Table 5 depict, when at least two pricing periods are expected? Table A Drone Operator Andrew Drone Operator Andrew LOW Price HIGH Price Drone Drone Operator Andrew Drone Operator Andrew Operator Charges LOW Price: Charges HIGH Price: gets Jasmine LOW gets $1,000 profit $0 profit Drone Operator Price Drone Operator Jasmine Jasmine Charges LOW Charges LOW Price: gets $1,000 profit Price: gets $2.000 profit Drone Drone Operator Andrew Drone Operator Andrew Operator Charges LOW Price: Charges HIGH Price: gets Jasmine gets $2,000 profit $1,500 profit Drone HIGH Price Drone Operator Jasmine Operator Jasmine Charges Charges HIGH Price: HIGH Price: gets $1.500 gets $0 profit profit Table 5 Pricing Strategy Scenario TABLE 5 First Period First Second Second Total Profit Price Choice Period Period Price Period in both (High or Profit Choice (High Profit periods Low) or Low) Andrew High $1,500 High $1,500 $3,000 Jasmine High $1,500 High $1,500 $3,000 a) Andrew plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Jasmine plays "Tit-for-Tat." O b) Andrew plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Jasmine "cheats." O c) Jasmine plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Andrew "cheats." O d) Jasmine "cheats" and Andrew "cheats." ( e) Jasmine does not know what Andrew will do, so Jasmine chooses the Nash Noncooperative Equilibrium price strategy.Table A shows the pricing options for two drone operators, Andrew and Jasmine: as an oligopoly in a local market. Which of the following pricing strategy scenarios does Table 2 depict; when there are at least two pricing periods expected? Table A Drone Operator Andrew LOW Price Drone Operator Andrew HIGH Price Drone Operator Jasmine LOW Price Drone Operator Andrew Charges LOW Price: gets $1,000 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges LOW Price: gets $1,000 profit Drone Operator Andrew Charges HIGH Price: gets $0 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges LOW Price: gets $2.000 profit Drone Operator Jasmine HIGH Price Drone Operator Andrew Charges LOW Price: gets $2,000 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges HIGH Price: gets $0 profit Drone Operator Andrew Charges HIGH Price: gets $1,500 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges HIGH Price: gets $1.500 profit Table 2 Pricing Strategy Scenario TABLE 2 First Period First Second Second Total Profit Price Choice Period Period Price Period for both (High or Profit Choice (High Profit periods Low) or Low Andrew Low $1,000 Low $1,000 $2,000 Jasmine Low $1,000 Low $1,000 $2,000 a) Andrew plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Jasmine plays "Tit-for-Tat." b) Andrew plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Jasmine "cheats." O c) Jasmine "cheats" and Andrew "cheats." O d) Jasmine plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Andrew "cheats." O e) Expecting only one pricing period, Jasmine chooses the Nash Non-cooperative Equilibrium price strategy