Task: Please watch the video, read pages 7-12 below, and answer questions below.

Link of the video: https://youtu.be/jSSE7WrBrB8?si=eZEmBj95WuECESJo

variety of venues to gain insights not possible to gain from a phone interview or literature review. These venues visits, however, were informed by our literature review and phone interviews, which enabled us to prepare specific objectives for our visits. In all, we visited 12 venues. In each case, our visit included an extensive interview with venue security and a behind the scenes tour that typically included the Command Center, screening of employees and patrons, the inner perimeter, loading dock, patron seating, and VIP areas. We were given widespread access to venues, both before and during an event. Our visits included venues representing five different sports and included seven multi-use venues, located in five states. Our visits included venues for MLB. NBA, NHL, MLB spring training minor league hockey, NCAA football, NCAA basketball, and NASCAR. Our observations at the venues were shared with venue security operators and, in some cases, with officials at DHS and New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness. We sought to create a dialogue among experts in stadium security by hosting a one-and-one-half day workshop at Rutgers University in February 2013. This invitation-only workshop attracted key sports stadium security experts from around the country, as well as representatives of the private sector and government agencies involved in stadium security. The goal was to engage them in a dialogue to discuss best practices and lessons learned. While we endeavored to keep the workshop small in order to facilitate dialogue, the strong interest in the topic led us to include 76 participants. To frame the workshop goals, two expert panel discussions were featured, one on Venue Security and Counterterrorism Challenges and one on Components of an Effective Security and Counterterrorism Plan. In the first panel, we asked the participants to describe the three things that keep them up at night. There was surprising unanimity here and it served as an excellent backdrop for the rest of the workshop. We also broke the participants into ten breakout groups, five on one day and five on the next, reflecting topics our literature review had led us to emphasize: Planning and Evaluating; Venue Profile; Risk Assessment; Leadership, Organization and Authority; Physical Security Measures; Counter-Terrorism Protective Measures; Integrated Communications Systems; Exercise, Education and Training; Quality Assurance Programs; and Incident Management. 10Identifying the Key Best Practices and Developing Metrics for Each We concentrate here on addressing the technical criteria for SAFETY Act coverage: Has there been demonstrated utility and effectiveness of the component? Is the plan (and its components) readily available for deployment? Is there evidence to establish the plan's (or its components') capability to reduce risks of harm? Is the plan effective in facilitating defense against acts of terrorism? We also address questions such as: Does the plan allow for flexibility in the event of the receipt of actionable intelligence suggesting actions or responses at the stadium need to be prioritized and considered? Does the plan facilitate the Incident Command System (ICS) protocols in the event of an incident? Does the plan perform as intended? Does it conform to the stadium operator's specifications? Is the plan safe for use as intended? There are many different components of an effective anti-terrorism plan. These include inspection procedures, access control, credentialing, perimeter control, mail room and loading dock access, training and exercises, communication, monitoring and surveillance, effect of nearby facilities, transportation access, evacuation planning, and any number of other factors. Based on the literature review, interviews, venue visits, and the workshop, we have studied the various components of an anti-terrorism plan that make it suitable for SAFETY Act coverage We provide three levels of recommendations about important components of an anti-terrorism plan such as strongly recommended, recommended, and suggested. We also note that some components are strongly recommended if a venue has certain characteristics, for example security collaborations with a public transportation system if one exists. While no one size fits all, most of the "strongly recommended" items can be addressed by most venues. It should not be assumed, however, that an application for SAFETY Act protections will be satisfactory just because it addresses all of the "strongly recommended" components. Rather, each applicant needs to seriously consider which of the recommendations or suggestions to address, based on the specific needs or technical characteristics of their venue. For each important component, we attempt to give guidelines for determination of successful inclusion of the component in an anti-terrorism plan. We term such criteria metrics. We believe that metrics are important enough that we highlight them in tables throughout this guide and discuss them in the text. In many cases, the "best" metrics are those that involve quantification: 11How many times did you exercise so and so in the past year? How long does it take to empty your stadium? What is the length of the longest line at your security check? Other times, the best metrics are simply yes-no, but with the need to expand on a "yes" answer. For example: Are your risk assessments revised depending upon the type of event? Upon the time of year? If yes, then how? Are any technical tools or professional resources used to do the risk assessments? If so, which ones? We attempted to use metrics that are based on performance rather than prescription wherever possible. For example, we think it is more useful to know how many fans have a basic knowledge of evacuation procedures (performance metric) than to know how often evacuation procedure instructions are relayed to the fans (prescriptive metric). That said, it was not possible for us to only use performance metrics. In this guide we attempt to highlight useful metrics without providing accompanying recommended levels of performance. For example, as mentioned above, how long it takes to empty the stadium is a useful metric discussed, but we do not discuss how quickly we believe a stadium of a certain size should be able to clear out. The development of more precise, quantitative metrics could be the subject of future research. In connection with our "important components," we have researched testing methods appropriate for an operational environment. For instance, we looked for metrics that could be used to measure things like probability of detection, false positive and false negative rates, limits of detection, interfering factors, and timing. Of course, some of these are not easy to determine, let alone measure. Our metrics and recommendations address questions like: Has the component been deployed and successful deployment documented? Is domain expertise appropriate and available for that component? Have internal or external audits been conducted and with what results? Are those audits conducted in a "double-loop" learning environment, facilitating a cyclical review and appropriate adjustment to the anti-terrorism plan based on the dynamic nature of the threat? Is there favorable patron feedback? Is the component independently testable and are the tests repeatable? Does the component consistently demonstrate low failure rates and false alarms? Does the component have high reliability? Does the component perform in accordance with specifications? Are the installation and maintenance procedures for the component proven? Are the documented processes such as training, hiring, and refreshing being followed? Are identified standards achieved? 12Introduction to the Project Millions of Americans attend sporting events at our nation's stadiums, arenas, and other venues each year. These stadiums and arenas are a key component of what is estimated to be at least a $40 billion dollar yearly economic activity. Many of them also have significant iconic value. Because of their visibility, the large crowds in attendance, the potential for fatalities or injuries, infrastructure disruption, economic losses, and psychological impact, they present an potential target for terrorists. This "Best Practices in Anti-Terrorism Security in Sports Venues Guide" discusses the important components of a stadium anti-terrorism security plan. More specifically, this Best Practices in Anti-Terrorism Security (BPATS) guide is aimed in assisting owners and operators of sports venues who are developing deploying and improving the anti-terrorism readiness of their venues and who are interested in submitting an application for coverage of their venue security under the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act." It is also intended to be a resource for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Safety Act Implementation (OSAI) as it manages the SAFETY Act Program. The SAFETY Act is not a regulatory program. Applications for coverage under the SAFETY Act are evaluated utilizing procedures and criteria set forth in the SAFETY Act Final Rule, which can be found at 6 C.F.R. Part 25 and as a downloadable resource from www.safetyact. gov. DHS leadership has significant discretion in making determinations and final decisions on applications submitted. The Guide is the result of a project carried out by the Command, Control, and Interoperability Center for Advanced Data Analysis (CCICADA), a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) University Center of Excellence (COE) based at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey. The SAFETY Act is aimed at encouraging the development and deployment of effective anti- terrorism technologies by providing certain liability protections. While to date more than 600 technologies have been approved under the SAFETY Act, only few sporting venues have applied for and received SAFETY Act protections for their security programs. Identifying the Additional information on the SAFETY Act, its benefits, and the application process can be found on the Program's website www.safetyact.gov.key components of anti-terrorism protection at sports stadiums is a basic step in aiding stadium operators to achieve a level of protection appropriate for SAFETY Act recognition and, at the same time, will provide tools and guidelines for OSAI in its evaluation of efforts by stadium operators and leagues. Background As noted, CCICADA is a DHS University Center of Excellence based at Rutgers University. CCICADA has been involved with stadium security almost since its inception in 2009. CCICADA has been joined in this project by the Center for Risk and Economic Assessment of Terrorism Events (CREATE), another COE based at the University of Southern California, and the Center for Transportation Safety, Security and Risk (CTSSR) at Rutgers University, which is part of the National Transportation Security Center of Excellence (NTSCOE). Identifying Best Practices in Anti-Terrorism Security in Sports Venues The project originally emphasized professional sports and their venues. Thus, we studied leagues and their venues from Major League Baseball (MLB), National Basketball Association (NBA), National Hockey League (NHL), Major League Soccer (MLS), US Tennis Association (USTA), and National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR). As the project progressed, we broadened the scope from its original emphasis on large, professional venues to a variety of others, including Minor League Baseball, MLB spring training facilities, minor league hockey, National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) venues, and NCAA conferences, and professional golf. After the April 2013 Boston Marathon attack, we also turned our attention to lessons learned from that incident and to adjustments made or considered both for open space events like running or bicycle races and for the other venues we had been studying. We also sought specific lessons learned from large venues that had experience dealing with broad, open spaces similar to the environment of the marathon, such as NASCAR and professional golf. Identification of best practices involved several components: (1) literature review; (2) interviews with stadium security directors, league security directors, and other sport security experts: (3) visits to a broad range of representative venues; (4) workshop with leading experts in stadium security. We began to identify the important components of a large structure sports venue Anti-TerrorismPlan (ATP) by examining the literature, some made available by OSAI and other DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) support personnel involved in the project, and the rest based on our research. The documents we reviewed included incident After Action Reports, academic research reports, published articles, special event operational procedures, best practices and research from other industries, technology reviews and user guidance, and league and association guidance documents. All in all, we reviewed more than 65 documents and pulled more than 1,500 passages and quotes, from those documents. We identified leading experts in sport stadium security and interviewed them, as well as interviewing representatives of standards developing organizations and accreditation and certification bodies. We chose individuals to interview based on recommendations, our own contacts, and information we gathered from discussions with other stadium security experts. We sought to interview representatives from a good sampling of types of venues, types of sports, types of leagues, and areas of expertise. To keep the interviews to a reasonable length, we focused each one on a small subset of the topics we had identified as key topics through our literature review. In all, we interviewed 28 subject matter experts, including eight security directors for venues in the US and Canada 12 private security providers, one of whom is based in the UK and has international experience; seven major sports leagues executives, including representatives from Major League Baseball, Major League Soccer, National Football League, US Tennis Association, and NASCAR; and one Executive Director of a UK National Stadium Security Organization. As we expanded the scope of the project, we added less formal interviews of officials involved in Minor League Baseball, Major League Baseball spring training, NCAA venues, and NCAA conferences. Interviews were conducted under a guarantee of confidentiality. Materials produced from the interview reports therefore aim to protect the privacy of the participant. Information gathered from interviews aided in the development of group discussion questions for the workshop. These interviews were important because they led us to concepts not adequately covered in the literature, if at all, and brought the concerns of venue operators and security managers to our attention. In addition to interviewing leading security experts associated with venues, we paid visits to a