TASKS/QUESTIONS 1.1 Write the strategic form/payoff matrix of the Game that represents this decision problem. 1.2 Write, in "BRRegion (Strat) =" notation, what each region's best response is/are to all the strategies their opponent may choose. 1.3 Is re = 2 a weakly dominant strategy for the East? Why/Why not? 1.4 Is rw = 2 a weakly dominant strategy for the West? Why/Why not? 1.5 Identify the Nash Equilibrium(s) for this Game and say whether it is (they are) a Strict Nash Equilibrium(s), Equilibrium(s) in Weakly Dominant Strategies, and/or Equilibrium(s) in Strongly Dominant Strategies. Explain your answers. 1.6 Find all the strategy combinations that Pareto-Dominate the Nash Equilibrium(s) 1.7 Find all the Pareto Optimals for this Game.PROBLEM 1 The East and the West are about to implement a joint economic program. Each region must decide what the size of their contribution to the program will be. The East must choose one of the following contribution sizes: r'E = 3. r; = 2, or r5 = l. The West must choose one of the following contribution sizes: r'w = 2, cw = 1, or 7'\"; = 0. After spending some months doing research about the potential economic consequences of the program, you've arrived at these 6 conclusions regarding the spillovers {payoffs} each region mav obtain: I If East picks T5- = 3, then the East's payoff will be calculated as: g-rw, where rw is whatever contribution size the West chooses. - If East picks r1.- = 2, then the East's payoff will be calculated as: 2 m, where rw is whatever contribution size the West chooses. - If East picks r3 = 1, then the East's pavowill be calculated as: (1w 1):, where rw is whatever contribution size the West chooses. a If West picks rw = 2, then the West's payoff will be calculated as: 1\