Technology Adoption: During the adoption of a new technology a CEO (player 1) can design a new task for a division manager. The new task can either be a high level (H) or low level (L). The manager simultaneously chooses to invest in good training (G) or bad training (B). The payoffs from this interaction is given by the following matrix: G B H 5, 4 5, 2 L 2, 2 0, 0 (a) Present the game in extensive form (a game tree) and solve for all the Nash Equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria (both in pure and in mixed strategies). (b) Now assume that before the game is played the CEO can choose not to adopt this new technology, in which case the payoffs are (1, 1), or to adopt it and then the game above is played. Present the entire game in extensive form. How many proper subgames does it have? (c) Solve for all the pure strategy Nash equilibria and all subgame perfect equilibria (in pure and in mixed strategies) of the game described in (b) above.