thanks in advance

Firm 1 and Firm 2 produce q, and q, units of a homogeneous good. Firm 1 is located upstream from Firm 2, and also produces z units of pollution. Costs for the two firms are given by: Ci(qi, z) = q1 + (2 - 1)2 C2(q2, =) = 92 + 0.12q2 Market demand for the good is given by P(qi + q2) = 2 - q1 - 92. (a) Set up the profit maximization problem for each firm. (b) How much will firm 1 choose to pollute? (c) What are the equilibrium quantities of output chosen by each firm? (d) Suppose there is a market for pollution. That is, firm 1 must pay firm 2 pa for each unit it pollutes. What is the equilibrium price of pollution? How much does firm 1 pollute? How do the equilibrium quantities of pollution and output in parts (b) and (c) compare to this new equilib rium? (e) How do the equilibrium quantities of output in part (c) compare to what you would observe if pollution was banned? (f) How do the equilibrium quantities of pollution and output in parts (b) and (c) compare to what you would observe if pollution was not banned but the firms acted as perfect competitions