The Assembly, the legislature of the fictional country of Manufa, is considering legislation that will generate benefits of $20 million and costs of $15 million. For perspective, Manufa's population is 60 million.

Passing the legislation is (Inefficient, efficient), and if everyone in Manufa shares equally in both its benefits and its costs, the Assembly will vote (against, for) the legislation.

If the costs of the legislation are concentrated among a few people instead of widespread among the population, those who benefit will be willing to spend up to (5 million, 35 million, 0 million, 15 million, 20 million) lobbying the Assembly against the legislation. (Note: Assume that the benefits are widespread; therefore, you can ignore them in the calculations of the few who experience the costs.)

The less widely spread are the benefits of the legislation, the (higher, lower) is the likelihood of lobbying for the legislation by those who will incur its benefits.

Suppose that, as before, the costs of the legislation are concentrated among a small group, the benefits are very widespread, and the Assembly is responsive to lobbying. The likely amount spent on lobbying for the legislation is (35 million, 20 million, 15 million, 0 million, 5 million), in which case the Assembly will likely vote (for, against) the legislation.