the demand tor gadgets is given by Q = 3130 P Acme Corp. is the only producer of gadgets. Acme's cost mction is: (30.1,) = 6t] :15. (a) How many gadgets will Acme produce and what price will it charge, if it wants to maximize its prots? How much prot will it make? (b) Now suppose Bingo Corp. enters the gadget industry, with exactlyr the same cost function as Acme, and the two rms engage in Cournot competition. How many gadgets will each rm make, what will be the price of gadgets, and how much prot will each rm make, in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium? (c) Suppose Acme and Bingo decide to collude. How many gadgets will each rm make, what will be the price of gadgets, and how much prot will each rm make, in the cartel equilibrium? (d) Finally, suppose Acme abides by the collusion agreement, but Bingo decides to cheat. Under this scenario, how many gadgets will each rm make, what will be the price of gadgets, and how much prot will each rm make?I