The following cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript is from the 1982 crash of Air Florida Flight 90 into the Potomac River in Washington, DC.

Key:Military Time- Local CA- Captain F/O- First Officer TWR- Tower

15:59:51 CA It's spooled. Real cold, real cold. 15:59:58 F/O God, look at that thing. That don't seem right, does it? Uh, that's not right 16:00:09 CA Yes it is, there's eighty 16:00:10 F/O Naw, I don't think that's right. Ah, maybe it is. 16:00:21 CA CAM-1 Hundred and twenty. 16:00:23 F/O CAM-2 I don't know 16:00:31 CA Vee-one. Easy, vee-two 16:00:39 [Sound of stick shaker starts and continues until impact] 16:00:41 TWR Palm 90 contact departure control. 16:00:45 CA Forward, forward, easy. We only want five hundred. 16:00:48 CA Come on forward....forward, just barely climb. 16:00:59 CA Stalling, we're falling! 16:01:00 F/O Larry, we're going down, Larry.... 16:01:01 CA I know it. 16:01:01 [Sound of impact]

In this example, the First Officer notices that something is wrong with the engine instruments, but the Captain disregards the F/O's concerns and continues with the takeoff. In fact, the F/O addresses the issue of something "not being right" six times, with one of those six almost an acceptance of the problem. The captain, for whatever reason, justified those "things" as being "normal" and did not use any of the conflicting information offered by the F/O.

• What do you think the F/O should have done?
• Would a more assertive F/O have prevented this catastrophe?
• Was the F/O's fear of job repercussions a factor in not speaking up to a superior (and highly experienced) Captain?
• Would the captain have even performed an abort procedure if the F/O were more assertive?