The following figure represents a possible distribution of preferences over taxation among different elected officials in the U.S.. The policy space ranges from 0 (low taxes) to 1 (high taxes). 0 f 1 Each point along the space represents the hypothetical bliss point of the different actors: p is the ideal tax preference of a relatively fiscal conservative President; c represents the ideal tax policy of the median legisla- tors in both houses of Congress. The President can veto any bill voted by Congress, but Congress can override a Presidential veto if two-thirds of its members vote to do so; v is the ideal point of the pivotal member of Congress (the legislator whose vote is needed to override the Presidential veto). Last, assume that for the Senate to be able to vote on a bill the Senate floor needs to vote for cloture, a proposal to close the debate and ending a filibuster which requires a majority of sixty of the 100-member Senate. Assume that the ideal position of the 60th Senator required to end the filibuster is f. Under these conditions, answer the following questions: V (a) Assuming that the status quo lies between c and f, can Congress secure a tax policy that it prefers to the status quo? What would be your prediction if the status quo lied bet een v and c, or between p and v, or between f and 1 (i.e., to the right of f)? (b) What do your responses tell us about gridlock, a persistent feature of American politics? How do these findings relate McKelvey's theorem which predict chaos and instability?