The Josh-Lester Corporation, manufacturer of tractors and other heavy farm equipment, is organized along decentralized product lines, with each manufacturing division operating as a separate profit center. Each division manager has been delegated full authority on all decisions involving the sale of that division's output both to outsiders and to other divisions of Josh-Lester .

Division C has in the past always purchased its requirement of a particular tractor-engine component from division A. However, when informed that division A is increasing its selling price to $150, division C's manager decides to purchase the engine component from external suppliers.

Division C can purchase the component for $125 per unit in the open market. Division A insists that, because of the recent installation of some highly specialized equipment and the resulting high depreciation charges, it will not be able to earn an adequate return on its investment unless it raises its price. Division A's manager appeals to top management of JoshLester for support in the dispute with division C and supplies the following operating data:

C's annual purchases of the tractor-engine component	2,000 units
A's variable cost per unit of the tractor-engine component	$105
A's fixed cost per unit of the tractor-engine component	$25

The company already completed an analysis to determine if it was in its best interest to have division C purchase 2,000 units from an external supplier for $125 per unit, assuming that there are no alternative uses for internal facilities of division A. Now, assume that division A can sell the 2,000 units to other customers at $153 per unit, with variable marketing costs of $3 per unit.

Purchase costs paid to external suppliers $250,000

Less: Savings in variable costs $210,000

Net cost to the company as a result of purchasing from external suppliers $40,000

Determine whether JoshLester will benefit if division C purchases the 2,000 units from external suppliers at $125 per unit. Show your computations.