The question is below.
Mays and Mccovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.40 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and Mccovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.)Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the protmaximizing price and combined quantity of output if Mays and McCovey choose to work together. 100 0.90 _ 0'50 Monopoly Outcome 0'10 0'30 0'50 040 PRICE (Dollars per can) 030 0.20 010 o 30 160 240 320 400 480 560 540 720 800 QUANTITY (Cans of beer) When they act as a prot-maximizing cartel, each company will produce cans and charge 55 information, each firm earns a daily profit of $ , so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is per can. Given this Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both rms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce the amount set under the collusive agreement. Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to $ Mays increases its output beyond the collusive quantity. , while McCovey's prot is now $ V to _ per can. Mays's prot is now . Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit v when When they act as a prot-maximizing cartel, each company will produce :] cans and charge per can. Given this information, each firm earns a daily profit of $ , so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $ Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both rms initially agree . - . - - half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit. '- cCovey continues to produce the amount set under the Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by collusive agreement. _ Increase Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to v to $ per can. Mays's prot is now $ , while McCovey's prot is now $ . Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit V when Mays increases its output beyond the collusive quantity. When they act as a protmaximizing cartel, each company will produce cans and charge 55 per can. Given this information, each firm earns a daily profit of $ , so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $ Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both rms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce t: - . collusive agreement. Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to V to $ per c $ Mays increases its output beyond the collusive quantity. , while McCovey's prot is now $ . Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit et under the decreases I increases
