The situation is the case of 'Partially Aligned Interests: Financial Adviser and Investor' in Chapter 9. You will complete a similar analysis for the case where the adviser's report has to be the coarser choice between B or "not B." In this case, the game is represented as the following tree: Invest 2, -52 You Bad Not 0, 0 Adviser Invest 2-L, -52 Not Bad You B (1/3) 'Not 0, 0 Nature Invest 2.2, -1.2 Adviser M. (1/3) You Not Bad Not 0, 0 G (1/3) Adviser Invest 13, 42 You Not Bad Not 0, 0 where L is the cost of lost reputation from exaggeration. This game has a Nash Equilibrium with Partial-revelation as (NB only if M or G, Invest if NB) if L >