The student, functioning as Director of Human Resources for Adverse Selection University (ASU), andbased on information presented to the Board and on his or her own economic analysis, will prepare awritten recommendation to the Benefits Committee on pricing the health insurance premium strategyin ASU's health plan with supporting rationale. Be sure to take into consideration the questions listed in Analytical Problem 9 when preparing your recommendation.

.I'. \"I'll, \"VIII-l Plvul'ulllg 9 Consider Table 10.1, which has data on insurance status and medical expenditures for different types of professors at Adverse Selection University (ASU). In 2014, every employee of ASU was offered a full insurance contract at no premium. In 2015, ASU charged any employee who wanted to keep health insurance a $4,000 premium. As a result, all history professors dropped their coverage in 2015. Assume that the underlying health of ASU professors did not change much from year to year. a Is there evidence of moral hazard in this market? How do you know? b Is there evidence of adverse selection in this market? How do you know? c Explain how moral hazard and adverse selection combine to create a positive risk- coverage correlation in this market. d Could the data exhibit a positive risk-coverage correlation if one of these elements were absent? How does this complicate researchers' efforts to nd evidence of adverse selection? Table 10.1. Inrmation from the human resources department MASH. 2014 2015 Insured? Average expenditures Insured? Average expenditures Economics professors Yes $5,000 Yes $5.000 History professors Yes $3,000 No $2.000