The table above provides reservation prices and costs for the inhabitants of Econland. Suppose we have an allocation where D3, D4, D5, D6, and D7 each consume a widget and S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5 each produce a widget. This is not Pareto efficient because a) S10 can produce a widget for D2, and D2 can give $8.50 to S10, and both are better off. b) the quantity is below the socially efficient level. c) D4 can give his widget to D2, and D2 can give $7 to D4, and both are better off. d) D7 can give his widget to D1, and D1 can give $9.5 to D7, and both are better off. e) None of the above. 8. Suppose we have an allocation where S1,S2,S3,S4,S5, S6, S7 each produce a widget and D1,D2,D3,D4,D5,D6, D7 each consume a widget. This is not Pareto efficient because a) we can have S9 sell to D1 for $9, S8 sell to D2 for $8, S7 sell to D3 for $7, and so on up to S1 sell to D9 for $1, and this will maximize output. b) S8 can sell a widget to D8 for $8 and both are better off