Then, Politician moves, either exerting high effort or low effort. If Voter decided previously that Politician must report, Voter knows the Politician's effort. If Voter decided that Politician must not report, Voter does not know the Politician's effort. b) List all strategies for each of two players in the extensive form game. How many strategies each of the two players has? (c) Find a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Write down the equilibrium strategy profile and players payoff in the equilibrium. (d) List other Nash equilibria of this game if there are any. Then, Politician moves, either exerting high effort or low effort. If Voter decided previously that Politician must report, Voter knows the Politician's effort. If Voter decided that Politician must not report, Voter does not know the Politician's effort. b) List all strategies for each of two players in the extensive form game. How many strategies each of the two players has? (c) Find a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Write down the equilibrium strategy profile and players payoff in the equilibrium. (d) List other Nash equilibria of this game if there are any