There are three Qs

Two identical firms make an identical product and face a demand curve P(Q) = 200 - 2Q. Their Marginal Cost of Production (MC) is a constant m = 40. D Question 1 0.5 pts If the firms collude to form a cartel, what will be the output of each firm? O q1 = 20 and q2 =10 O q1 = q2 = 10 O q1 = 40 and q2 =20 O q1 = q2 =5 O q1 = 10 and q1 = 5 O q1 = q2 = 20 O q1 = q2 = 40 O q1 = 80 and q2 =40Question 2 1 pts If the firms don't form a cartel, but instead compete simultaneously to reach a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, what would be the output of each firm? O q1 = q2 = 16.66 O q1 = q2 = 26.66 O q1 = q2 = 13.33 O q1 = q2 = 6.66 O q1 = q2 = 3.33 O q1 = q2 = 10 O q1 = q2 = 23.33 O q1 = q2 = 20 O 30Question 3 1 pts Now assume Firm 1 has a first mover advantage and Firm 2 moves second. What would be the output of each firm under the Stackelberg equilibrium? O q1 = 40 and q2 = 20 O q1 = 20 and q2 = 10 O q1 = q2 = 40 O q1 = q2 = 5 O q1 = q2 = 20 O q1 = 80 and q2 = 40 O q1 = 10 and q1 = 5 O q1 = q2 = 10