There are two firms in a market, i = 1, 2. They produce perfect substitutes using identical technologies c(y;) = i for i = 1, 2. Inverse market demand is: p(y) = 1-y (a) Compute the (simultaneous) Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities, profits, and price. (b) Suppose now that firm one only has the opportunity to sell output on another market as well. If it sells quantity x in this market its cost is c(x, y) = (3+yi) 2 Demand in the second market is: p(2) = a- a for some a > 0. Consider the simultaneous move game in which firm one chooses x and y1 and firm two chooses y2. What are the Nash equilibrium output levels (2, y1, y2)? (c) Show that a small increase in the parameter evaluated at a = = lowers firm one's profit. Provide an interpretation for this