There have been many court cases related to bona fide occupational qualifications. Employers may discriminate on the basis of sex, religion, or national origin if the characteristic can be justified as a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business or enterprise. Thus, a bona fide occupational qualification provides a legitimate reason an employer can use to exclude persons on otherwise illegal bases of consideration (Valentine et al., 2020, p. 77).

The first case I researched is Anderson v. City and County of San Francisco, 9^th Cir., No. 11-16746. In this case, the city and county of San Francisco were accused of engaging in unlawful sex bias by prohibiting male deputies from supervising female inmates in county jails. San Francisco defended this by using the BFOQ exception for several reasons. The city cited that they wanted to protect the safety of female inmates from sexual misconduct by male deputies, to maintain security in the face of female inmates ability to manipulate male guards and the guards fear of false allegations of sexual misconduct by the inmates, to protect the privacy of female inmates, and to promote the successful rehabilitation of female inmates (Kienbaum et al., 2014, Para. 5). The court ruled against the City and County of San Francisco because they did not establish that sex was a legal alternate for addressing their concerns over the policy and failed to argue the possibility of nondiscriminatory alternatives. I agree with the court's ruling because San Francisco did not give a legitimate reason to exclude male deputies from supervising female inmates, and their sex did not prevent them from adequately doing their jobs (Kienbaum et al., 2014).

The second case I researched is Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company, 277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967). Weeks contested that Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company refused to consider her bid for a job vacancy in the Switchman position based on her sex. A Switchman's role is to lift equipment, often over the head, routinely weighing up to thirty pounds, and do other strenuous activities such as moving heavy items by pushing or shoving. Because of Rule 59 of the Code of Georgia, which imposes a maximum weightlifting limitation for women of thirty pounds, the court ruled that sex was a BFOQ for the job. It also cited the job's other strenuous activities and working conditions to qualify (Weeks V. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company, 277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967), n.d.). I can't entirely agree with this decision because many women can lift over thirty pounds. This should not disqualify a woman for a promotion, especially if she can prove she can lift that weight and perform the job duties.

What are your thoughts on this?