There is an incumbent firm (player 1) and a potential entrant (player 2) in a market. The incumbent firm first chooses whether to invest in its production capacity or not. Upon observing the incumbent firm's choice, the potential entrant chooses between entering the market or staying out. If the potential entrant stays out, the game ends. If the potential entrant enters, the incumbent can choose between fighting a price war or accommodating the entrant. The payoffs are as follows: The investment costs C > 0. If the entrant stays out, the incumbent gets a profit (before deducting investment cost, if any) of 2 while the entrant's profit is 0, regardless of whether the investment is made. If the entrant enters and the incumbent accommodates, the incumbent gets a profit (before deducting investment cost, if any) of 1 while the entrant's profit is 1, regardless of whether the investment is made. The investment makes a difference if the incumbent decides to fight. If no investment is made and the incumbent fights the entrant, the incumbent gets 0 while the entrant gets 1. If an investment is made and the incumbent fights the entrant, the incumbent gets 1 (after deducting the investment cost) and the entrant gets 2. (a) Draw the game tree for this game. (b) Suppose C = 3. Solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. (Displaying the subgame perfect equilibrium in the extensive form is sufficient.) (c) For what range of values of C may the incumbent invest in a subgame pe