these are varies parts to one question. please help and ill give a thimbs up.

Iate 1/1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents. Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each weck Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: Quantity in gallons) Price Total Revenue (and Total Profit) lo S60 $0 100 55 5,500 200 so 10,000 300 45 13,500 400 40 16,000 500 35 17,500 600 30 18,000 700 25 17,500 1800 20 16,000 1900 15 13,500 1.000 10 10,000 11.100 15,500 0 10 1,200 Refer to Table 1-1. If the market for water were perfectly competitive instead of monopolistic, how many gallons of water would be demanded? Question 47 (1 point) 3 Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents. Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: 6 Quantity (in gallons) Price Total Revenue and Total Profit) 9 0 $60 $0 100 SS 5,500 12 200 50 10,000 1300 45 13,500 15 400 40 16,000 18 500 35 17.500 600 30 18,000 21 700 123 17,500 800 20 16,000 24 900 15 13,500 1.000 10 10.000 27 1.100 5.500 0 1.200 30 Refer to Table 17-1. What is the socially efficient quantity of water? 2 3 Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many pallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below. 5 6 Quantity (in gallons) Price Total Revenue (and Total Profit) 9 - 0 $60 SO 100 55 5,500 12 200 50 10,000 300 45 15 13,500 400 40 16,000 18 soo 35 17.500 600 30 18,000 21 1700 25 17,500 800 20 16,000 24 900 15 13,500 1,000 10 10,000 27 1.100 5 5.500 1,200 0 30 Refer to Table 17-1. If this market for water were perfectly competitive instead of monopolistic, what price would be charged Question 49 (1 point) Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below Quantity (in gallons) Price Total Revenue (and Total Profit) 9 $60 $0 12 100 55 5.500 200 50 10,000 15 300 45 13,500 400 10 16,000 18 500 35 17.500 600 30 18,000 21 700 125 17,500 800 20 16,000 24 900 15 13,500 1,000 10 10,000 27 1.100 5.500 1.200 30 Refer to Table 17.1. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Rochelle and Alec from operating as a monopoly. What will be the price of water once Rochelle and Alec reach a Nash equilibrium 2 3 Take 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: 5 6 8 9 Quantity in gallons) Price Total Revenue (and Total Profit) - 0 $60 SO 1 12 100 55 5,500 200 SO 10,000 4 15 300 45 13,500 400 140 16,000 7 18 500 35 17,500 600 30 18.000 21 700 17.500 25 20 800 16,000 24 900 15 13.500 1.000 10 10,000 27 1.100 5.500 30 1.200 10 Refer to Table 17-1. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Rochelle and Alec from operating as a monopoly. How many gallons of water will be produced and sold once Rochelle and Alec reach a Nash equilibrium? Iate 1/1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents. Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each weck Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: Quantity in gallons) Price Total Revenue (and Total Profit) lo S60 $0 100 55 5,500 200 so 10,000 300 45 13,500 400 40 16,000 500 35 17,500 600 30 18,000 700 25 17,500 1800 20 16,000 1900 15 13,500 1.000 10 10,000 11.100 15,500 0 10 1,200 Refer to Table 1-1. If the market for water were perfectly competitive instead of monopolistic, how many gallons of water would be demanded? Question 47 (1 point) 3 Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents. Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: 6 Quantity (in gallons) Price Total Revenue and Total Profit) 9 0 $60 $0 100 SS 5,500 12 200 50 10,000 1300 45 13,500 15 400 40 16,000 18 500 35 17.500 600 30 18,000 21 700 123 17,500 800 20 16,000 24 900 15 13,500 1.000 10 10.000 27 1.100 5.500 0 1.200 30 Refer to Table 17-1. What is the socially efficient quantity of water? 2 3 Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many pallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below. 5 6 Quantity (in gallons) Price Total Revenue (and Total Profit) 9 - 0 $60 SO 100 55 5,500 12 200 50 10,000 300 45 15 13,500 400 40 16,000 18 soo 35 17.500 600 30 18,000 21 1700 25 17,500 800 20 16,000 24 900 15 13,500 1,000 10 10,000 27 1.100 5 5.500 1,200 0 30 Refer to Table 17-1. If this market for water were perfectly competitive instead of monopolistic, what price would be charged Question 49 (1 point) Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below Quantity (in gallons) Price Total Revenue (and Total Profit) 9 $60 $0 12 100 55 5.500 200 50 10,000 15 300 45 13,500 400 10 16,000 18 500 35 17.500 600 30 18,000 21 700 125 17,500 800 20 16,000 24 900 15 13,500 1,000 10 10,000 27 1.100 5.500 1.200 30 Refer to Table 17.1. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Rochelle and Alec from operating as a monopoly. What will be the price of water once Rochelle and Alec reach a Nash equilibrium 2 3 Take 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Rochelle and Alec, own wells that produce safe drinking water Each week Rochelle and Alec work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Rochelle and Alec can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: 5 6 8 9 Quantity in gallons) Price Total Revenue (and Total Profit) - 0 $60 SO 1 12 100 55 5,500 200 SO 10,000 4 15 300 45 13,500 400 140 16,000 7 18 500 35 17,500 600 30 18.000 21 700 17.500 25 20 800 16,000 24 900 15 13.500 1.000 10 10,000 27 1.100 5.500 30 1.200 10 Refer to Table 17-1. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Rochelle and Alec from operating as a monopoly. How many gallons of water will be produced and sold once Rochelle and Alec reach a Nash equilibrium